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1.  Commercial Operations at Sellafield - underperformance and missed targets 
 
This paper is submitted by CORE [Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive Environment]
1 for 
consideration by the Committee of Public Accounts (PAC) following the Committee’s visit to 
Sellafield  on  26
th  November  2012  and  its  subsequent  report  published  in  February  2013 
‘Nuclear Decommissioning Authority: Managing risk at Sellafield (Twenty fourth Report 
of Session 2012-13). This Report was preceded by a report from the National Audit Office 
(NAO) ‘Managing Risk Reduction at Sellafield’ published in November 2012. 
 
The PAC Report has been widely welcomed as an overdue exposé of the current status of 
legacy  waste  facilities  and  the  shortcomings  in  the  management  of  major  projects  at 
Sellafield. The site’s commercial operations were however outside the scope of PAC’s report 
- as they were for the NAO, yet the latter felt able to comment that  ‘other activities on the 
site have improved, notably the increase in the amount of spent nuclear fuel reprocessed 
each year’ 
2.  
 
As  this CORE report demonstrates, there has  been  no such  improvement  in reprocessing 
performance - the reprocessing facilities producing a sequence of mediocre throughput and 
production rates that have met neither annual targets nor design specifications.  It is regretted 
that NAO and others
3 have been misled in this respect, particularly as such misinformation 
masks the yawning gap between the level at which these commercial facilities were designed 
to operate and the level at which they are actually operating today.  
 
The underperformance of the commercial facilities stems from a range of technical issues that 
are exacerbated by the ageing of plant, the unreliability of associated facilities, accidents and 
other  unforeseen  events.  And  whilst  a  combination  of  these  limiting  factors  clearly 
contributes to the now almost perennial failure to meet annual targe ts, it cannot explain why 
those targets are set at such unrealistic levels in the first place or why, year after year, the 
same misjudgements are repeated. 
The extent, likely causes and ramifications of this routine failure to set realistic targets for 
Sellafield’s commercial facilities are assessed in this CORE report which is submitted as 
written evidence to the PAC for scrutiny.  
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As  the  ‘flip-side’  of  the  NDA’s  overall  Sellafield  portfolio  coin,  the  site’s  commercial 
operations play a crucial role as a major source of revenue in support of the NDA’s clean-up 
and decommissioning programmes and thereby determine the extent of additional monies that 
need to be raised annually from the public purse in order to continue and complete those 
programmes.  
The underperforming commercial facilities covered in this report are the  Thermal Oxide 
Reprocessing  Plant  (B570  THORP),  the  Magnox  Reprocessing  Plant  (B205)  and  the 
Waste Vitrification Plant  (B355). Further  supporting  information on these operations  is 
provided in a sequence of Appendices which also include the Sellafield Plan
4 and the High 
Level Waste (HLW) Evaporators. 
 
An assessment of this phenomenon of setting unrealistic targets  is likely to conclude that, 
rather than resulting from chance, bad luck or coincidence, it stems from an alarming level of 
misjudgement by those who set the targets – in this case the NDA and Sellafield Ltd, the site 
licence company owned by parent body organisation Nuclear Management Partners (NMP). 
 
The  NMP  consortium,  contracted  by  the  NDA  in  2008  to  deliver  not  only  legacy 
decommissioning  but  also  fuel  recycling  and  waste  management  operations,  boasts  an 
impressive level of reprocessing expertise with French partner Areva claiming that ‘with over 
30 years of experience (Areva)  is the international reference in the field of used fuel 
recycling’
5. Moreover, the ranks of the NDA itself are today populated with staff who, as ex-
employees  of  British  Nuclear  Fuels  plc  (BNFL)  had  first-hand  experience  of  Sellafield’s 
commercial operations, with many holding senior positions as plant managers. These include 
the  NDA’s  current  Chief  Executive  who,  during  his  BNFL  days,  served  ‘three  years  as 
Director of Production, where he was accountable for the majority of operational activities 
at Sellafield.
6 
 
Inexplicably,  such  expertise  and  experience  does  not  appear  to  filter  through  to  the 
deliberations of the NDA and Sellafield Ltd today in setting future levels of throughput or 
production (annual targets) for the commercial facilities.  Following initial discussions by 
both  parties  to  evaluate  any  technical,  regulatory  or  other  issues  likely  to  inhibit  plant 
performance, annual targets are set by the NDA - with tactical delivery of those targets being 
the responsibility of Sellafield Ltd. 
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Given the level of expertise available, the NDA’s failure over recent years to set realistically 
achievable  targets  therefore  begs  the  question  as  to  why  such  expertise  is  ignored  or 
discounted  by  the  NDA,  or  why  the  potential  threat  from  factors  likely  to  limit  plant 
performance  -  well  understood  by  many  stakeholders  outside  the  industry  who  follow 
proceedings closely, is routinely ignored or misunderstood.  
 
Whether the repeated inflation of target figures stems from a desire by the NDA to impress or 
placate anxious customers and/or its sponsoring Department of Energy & Climate Change 
(DECC)  – or to conceal from them the realities of ‘conditions on the ground’ at Sellafield - is 
open to debate, as is the view that, overstretched by the expansion of its original remit of 
clean-up  and  decommissioning  to  include  oversight  of  nuclear  waste  disposal  and 
involvement  in  new-build  issues  in the UK, the NDA  has  become overstretched and  it’s 
judgement and performance adversely affected. 
 
Common sense dictates that given the technical complexity of the facilities and the processes 
involved, together with their dependence on associated plant, a failure to meet annual targets 
might be expected periodically – but not on the current scale as shown in Table 1 below.  
 
Table 1 
 
 
 
   
                  Sources: Government, BNFL, BNG and NDA Reports, presentations and FoI requests 
 
 
                                           B570 THORP                     B205 Magnox                    B355 Waste
                                           Reprocessing        Reprocessing       Vitrification
             tonnes             tonnes          canisters
f/yr    target   actual    target actual    target actual
2000/01 833 362 500 366 n/a 131
2001/02 734 736 800 786 300 120
2002/03 500 502 800 765 250 333
2003/04 671 671 905 1038 340 341
2004/05 725 599 1000 1008 460 478
2005/06 * 51 720 243 500 482
2006/07 * 0 900 594 450 322
2007/08 * 51 900 457 355 314
2008/09 280 116 540 430 400 242
2009/10 200 217 770 451 400 382
2010/11    <400 350 703 233 228 96
2011/12 419 429 800 603 231 221
2012/13 408 228 695 383 197 148
key:      met    failedpage 4 
 
Table 1 shows that, in percentage terms, 72% of the targets set for the three facilities have 
been missed during the 13-year period 2000/01 to 2012/13. In many cases the failure has 
been  by  significant  margins  –  with  Magnox  reprocessing  leading  the  field  for  major 
discrepancies.  By contrast, on the relatively few occasions when targets have been met, the 
margins are generally very small – or have been met exactly.  
 
Significantly, the overall failure rate of 72% has increased   to a startling 92% for the 8-year 
period commencing 2005/06 when the NDA took ownership of Sellafield and its operations. 
For THORP’s performance it should be noted that the missed targets between 2005/06 and 
2008/09 – with little spent fuel reprocessed - can be attributed solely to the extended closure 
of the plant following a major leakage accident in 2005. As will be seen, the damage caused 
by the accident has had significant implications for the plant’s future throughput rates. 
 
Whilst the setting of ambitious annual targets may be viewed as a driver for encouraging 
enhanced plant performance, the downside of failing to meet those targets - for Sellafield’s 
reprocessing plant THORP and B205 particularly - is the knock-on effect of further extending 
the  scheduled  plant  closure  dates.  Past  underperformance  by  both  facilities  has  already 
necessitated life extensions to THORP (from 2010 to 2018) and B205 (from 2012 - 2016/17 
or beyond) - the current closure dates representing major milestones in the NDA’s clean-up 
and decommissioning programme. that will be undermined by further extensions.  
 
In addition, such extensions to reprocessing programmes also pose a serious threat to the 
ability of the UK to meet its radioactive discharge commitments made under the Oslo/Paris 
(OSPAR) convention – to which the UK Government is a signatory. Further, for THORP 
reprocessing particularly, the continued underperformance creates uncertainties as to the final 
composition of the UK’s radioactive waste inventory for the purpose of the Government’s 
Managing Radioactive Wastes Safely (MRWS) programme. These issues are outlined in the 
Appendices on Magnox (Appendix 4) and THORP reprocessing (Appendix 2) respectively, 
the former relating to meeting, by 2020, the target for concentrations of radioactivity in the 
marine environment set by OSPAR in 1998, and the latter to the amount of UK-owned spent 
fuel in the inventory of spent fuel/wastes requiring final disposal.  
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Whilst the now-closed Sellafield MOX Plant (SMP) is not covered in this CORE report, the 
plant’s failure as a production facility to meet annual targets more than matches the failures  
of  the  reprocessing  and  vitrification  facilities.  Commencing  operations  in  2002/03  and 
projected to produce 120 tonnes of mixed oxide fuel (MOX) per year, not a single annual 
target was met during its lifetime – its best performance of 4.7 tonnes of MOX fuel being 
achieved  in  its penultimate  year of operation 2009/10. On  its  closure  in 2011, SMP  had 
produced a total of 13.8 tonnes in 9 years of operation
7. 
 
Whilst CORE’s report does not infer that the underperformance of commercial facilities or 
the  failure  of  the  NDA  to  set  realistic  targets  directly  compromises  health  and  safety  at 
Sellafield  or  to  its  workforce  and  the  general  public,  it  is  clear  that  any  extension  to 
commercial  operations  at  Sellafield  resulting  from  continued  underperformance  must 
necessarily prolong the period of potential risks to health and safety from those operations. 
 
 
Summary 
There has been a repeated failure since 2000/01 for Sellafield’s commercial facilities to meet 
not only design specifications but also the annual performance targets set for them by the 
NDA. Since 2005, when ownership of Sellafield and its operations passed to the NDA, the 
failure rate has deteriorated further – with targets for the current year already under threat.  
 
The result of the failure of the facilities to meet targets has been the need to extend their 
operational lifetimes which in turn threaten the prospect of major milestones in the NDA’s 
clean-up and decommissioning programme being achieved. Further, as a source of revenue in 
support of the NDA’s programme, the underperformance also impacts on the level of extra 
monies  that  have  to  be  levied  from  the  public  purse  to  meet  the  NDA’s  financing 
requirements. 
 
Whilst the age, reliability and other  limiting  factors of the  facilities  and associated plant 
covered in CORE’s report have contributed to their overall underperformance, they cannot 
explain the perennial setting of inappropriate and patently unrealistic targets by the NDA.  
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A logical assessment of the underlying causes of this year on year failure might conclude  
that the NDA’s failure bears the hallmark of an organisation incapable of making best use of  
available  expertise,  and  one  poorly  equipped  to  understand  the  capabilities  of  the  site’s 
commercial  facilities.  Alternatively,  it  may  either  point  to  a  covert  desire  to  impress 
customers and Government that ‘all’s well’ at Sellafield or suggest that the expansion of its 
original  clean-up  and  decommissioning  remit  to  include  other  Government  policies  has 
resulted in the NDA becoming overstretched and its  performance thereby adversely affected. 
  
Whatever the reason, this abject record represents poor value to UK taxpayers who expect  
Sellafield’s  commercial  operations  to  be  managed  with  nothing  less  than  the  upmost 
competence and  financial rigour. In their  financial context, the commercial operations of 
reprocessing and fuel management for the current financial year 2013/14 are projected to 
provide over 70% of the NDA’s total projected income (£633M of £887M)  whilst incurring 
a projected operational expenditure of £706M and capital expenditure of up to £266M – a 
total of £972M
8.  
As noted earlier, Sellafield’s commercial operations lay outside the scope of both the NAO 
and the PAC reports on the NDA’s management of risk on the site. An update by the NAO  
(October 2013) which provides a summary of the NDA’s activity and performance for the 
financial year 2012/13  includes references to the work of ‘a number of other bodies (who) 
regularly  produce  independent  analyses  of  how  the  Authority  is  doing  and  of  the 
challenges  it  faces’
9.  Once  again,  an  analysis  of  Sellafield’s  commercial  operations  is 
conspicuous by its absence. 
 
Recommendation 
The absence of Government scrutiny or analysis of NDA’s performance in relation to 
Sellafield’s commercial operations needs to be addressed with urgency. Unless and until 
a sense of operational  reality can be instilled within the  NDA, its current failures – 
particularly  in  forecasting  and  setting  future  performance  levels  -  are  likely  to  be 
perpetuated. This carries implications not only for the NDA’s overall programme at 
Sellafield  and  related  Government  policies  but  also  in  respect  of  ensuring  that  UK 
taxpayers  are  getting  full  value  for  the  significant  monies  expended  on  commercial 
operations.  
 
 
 page 7 
 
2.  Appendices                                            
Appendix 1 
 
The Sellafield Performance Plan (the Plan). 
 
The Plan was published by the NDA in August 2011and was the first such performance document to 
be placed in the public domain by the Authority since 2006
10. The Plan was billed  as enabling the 
vital monitoring of the progress of operating plant and other key activities.  In the event, the glossy 
Plan disappointingly contains significantly less detail than the Near Term Work Plans (NTWP) and 
Life Cycle Base Line Plans (LCBL) that preceded it and  which, for many stakeholders,  provided a 
more valuable scrutiny tool than the Plan.  
 
Despite the advance billing, operational target figures were wholly absent from the Plan on its 
publication date. This omission of targets was partly rectified some months later with the publication 
by the NDA of an Appendix
11 to the Plan in early  2012 and only some 15 months later (November 
2012) were specific figures provided in a further Appendix
12.  
 
Examples of the shortcomings of the Plan (both initial and subsequent) and the NDA’s target-setting 
optimism is provided in Tables 2 & 3. Omitted from the original Plan, the Tables are extracted from 
the  additional  appendices  and,  as  examples,  relate  to  the  throughput  projected  for  Magnox 
reprocessing.   
 
 
Table 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen, Table 2 provides projected annual throughput figures as percentage figures which, 
unless the total volume of Magnox spent fuel to be reprocessed is known, is meaningless to most 
stakeholders and of little use as a scrutiny tool.  
 
Table 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For its part, Table 3 shows that whilst the targets are still provided in percentage figures, they have 
also been converted to tonnages. Though this allows some check to be made of actual performance 
against the projections made in the Plan (the principal object of the Plan), the figures are simply not 
considered to be credible. 
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As  an  example,  during  the  period  2005/06  to  2010/11,  2408  tonnes  of  Magnox  spent  fuel  was 
reprocessed at an annual average of just 400 tonnes (see Table 1). For thw Plan to now credit the 
plant with projected throughputs of 600 to 700 tonnes per year from 2012 onwards therefore appears 
to be wholly out of kilter with the plant’s track record. Neither does it take into account the increasing 
age of the plant, the acknowledged potential for failures in vital associated facilities nor the statutory 
biennial shutdown required under site licence. This biennial outage generally lasts for three months 
and usually results in a reduced throughput for that year.  
 
In the absence of another explanation it appears likely that in an attempt to present its commercial 
projections to the wider world, the NDA has simply divided the outstanding tonnage of fuel to be 
reprocessed  by  the  number  of  years  remaining  before  the  plant’s  scheduled  closure  date.  This 
mathematically convenient method results in a relative ‘flat lining’ of the figures and obscures the 
sometimes widely fluctuating throughputs as recorded historically. The apparent use of this method 
throughout  the  Plan  and  its  appendices  raises  questions  about  the  overall  value  of  the  Plan  and 
undermines its credibility.  
 
In a nutshell, and despite the NAO plaudits, the Plan falls far short of what might be expected from a 
collective of organisations lead by the NDA which, between them, have a wide range of expertise and 
resources to draw upon. The visible failure to capitalise on these resources  – as the missed-target 
figures suggest is, in CORE’s view, equally as disturbing as the concerns relating to legacy and major 
project issues previously raised by NAO and PAC.  
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Appendix 2 
 
 
B570 Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP). 
 
THORP’s failure to meet annual throughput targets set by successive operators, as shown in Table 1, 
is equalled by its failure to achieve its original design specification throughput rate of 1000 to 1200 
tonnes per year as claimed by BNFL. This annual rate related specifically to the plant’s ‘Baseload’ 
contract period which was described as the first 10 years of operation – 1994 to 2003. For the ‘Post-
Baseload’ contract, throughput would be reduced to 850 tonnes annually. 
 
Achieving its highest Baseload annual throughput of 890 tonnes in 1999/2000, THORP averaged 514 
tonnes per year over the ten-year period – just 50% of its design specification and BNFL’s claim. The 
promised  completion  of  the  Baseload’s  7000  tonne  order  book,  due  by  2003/04,  was  eventually 
achieved in December 2012
13 – some 9 years late.  
 
In April 2005, BNFL admitted to a major leakage accident at THORP that involved the spillage of 
83,000  litres  of  spent  fuel  dissolved  in  nitric  acid.  Subsequently  classified  as  Level  3  on  the 
International Nuclear Event Scale (INES), the irreparable damage caused by the spilled liquor to one 
of two storage tanks and associated pipework in the plant’s Feed Clarification Cell resulted in a plant 
closure of over two and a half years and reduced  future throughput by some 50%. NDA maintains 
today that THORP is still capable of achieving a reprocessing rate in the order of 600 tonnes per year.  
 
Currently there remain approximately 2,500 tonnes of spent fuel to be reprocessed in THORP. This is 
comprised  of c300 tonnes from Overseas, c150 tonnes  from Dounreay and the balance  of c2000 
tonnes from the UK’s EDF-owned AGR reactors. Against this, THORP’s closure ‘with all contracts 
completed’ is scheduled for year 2017/18 in the Plan which projects an annual throughput varying 
from 330-450 tonnes
14 (the targets) which, barring unforeseen events, lie within THORP’s capability.  
 
The issue of exactly how much UK AGR fuel will be reprocessed rests with the NDA. One tranche of 
AGR fuel is specifically  destined for reprocessing and aligns  with THORP’s Baseload and Post-
Baseload order book. A second tranche is designated for reprocessing OR storage.. The tranches are 
shown in Appendix 6 Figure 1  
15  
 
If THORP meets its currently scheduled 2018 closure date ‘with all contracts completed’, the plant 
will have reprocessed a total of 9500 tonnes of spent fuel over 25 years of operation
16 at an average 
annual  rate of 380 tonnes per year (or 420 tonnes per year if the plant’s extended closure from 2005 
is taken into account) – just one-third of design specification. 
 
Whilst THORP’s underperformance can be blamed on a litany of technical problems, accidents and 
unplanned closures, the most significant risk to meeting targets  is the current ‘lack of evaporative 
capacity’ to process the liquid high level wastes (HLW) produced by both THORP and B205. The 
problems associated with Sellafield’s HLW Evaporators are described in the Appendix 3 below. 
 
The target of 424 tonnes set  for THORP for 2013/14 is already  under threat with only 105 
tonnes being reprocessed in the first 6 months of the financial year
17-  
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Appendix 3 
 
Evaporation and Evaporator D. 
 
Age-related and other weaknesses within the site’s suite of three Evaporators (A,B & C) have played 
a part in limiting THORP and B205’s progress in the past and, in some cases, have resulted in a 
complete  cessation  of  reprocessing  at  THORP  as  demanded  by  the  then  Nuclear  Installations 
Inspectorate (NII – now ONR). This because of the occasions when, with one or two of the three 
Evaporators being out of action, priority use of the remaining Evaporator C has been allocated to 
Magnox reprocessing for safety and hazard reduction reasons. 
 
The unreliability of Evaporators A, B & C resulted in a new (fourth) Evaporator (D) being ordered by 
BNFL who warned that ‘ if additional evaporative capacity is not provided then it may not be 
possible to ….complete existing reprocessing contracts for commitments already made
18  (emphasis 
added). Until such times as Evaporator D actually comes ‘on-line’, reprocessing therefore remains
19 
wholly dependent on the limited reliability of existing Evaporators.  
 
A simplified plan of the existing Evaporators  (see Appendix 6  Figure 2) shows that THORP is 
configured for the use of Evaporator C only whereas B205 Magnox is configured for all three. The 
ageing Evaporators A & B (commissioned in 1970 and 1985 respectively) have suffered  frequent 
closure resulting from problems with the corrosion of internal cooling coils, leaving Evaporator C’s 
capacity to be shared between reprocessing plant - the lion’s share prioritised for B205. Evaporator C 
is itself subject to periodic outages for internal camera investigation (as required by ONR) following 
its extended outage in 2009 to examine the remnant thickness of its own internal cooling coils.  
 
The  liquid  High  Level  Wastes  produced  by  reprocessing  are  transferred  to  the  Evaporators  for 
‘volume  reduction  by  evaporation’  before  being  consigned  to  the  Highly  Active  Storage  Tanks 
(HASTS) where, after a period  of cooling, the  waste  is  vitrified  in the Waste  Vitrification Plant 
(WVP) and then, as vitrified product, moved into storage prior to overseas return or final disposal in 
the UK. 
 
 
Evaporator D 
 
 Originally planned to come on-line in 2010, Evaporator D’s start-up date is now scheduled for 2016 
in the Plan which advises that ‘until this project is complete, reprocessing throughput will be limited 
by the capacity of existing evaporators’
20.  
 
Whilst  recent  Government  reports  have  highlighted  the  poor  project  management  and  significant 
overspend by the NDA on the Evaporator D project
21, they fail to credit that the original rationale for 
the Evaporator  – to support the  completion  of  existing reprocessing contracts  – has largely been 
nullified by the delays to the project. For even if Evaporator D does come on line in 2016 it will 
benefit THORP reprocessing for a period  of little over 12 months and even less – if at all – should 
Magnox reprocessing be completed to schedule by 2016/17.  
 
The later than planned arrival of the last of eleven Evaporator modules at Sellafield in late September 
2013 suggests that further delays are possible as does the investigation announced by ONR in May 
into a written complaint relating to the quality of some manufactured components
22. 
 
.  
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Appendix 4 
 
Magnox Reprocessing 
The reprocessing of Magnox spent fuel in B205 commenced in 1964.  The plant was designed to 
reprocess 1500 tonnes per year and early day operations saw throughputs in excess of 1000 tonnes per 
year achieved routinely. By the 1990’s annual throughput rates had fallen to the high hundreds of 
tonnes, and by year 2000 to under 500 tonnes.  
 
Scrutinised in detail under BNFL’s Stakeholder Dialogue process in 2000, BNFL was adamant that, 
with B205’s then projected  closure in 2012, the plant would achieve an annual throughput rate of 
1000 tonnes or more. This much challenged optimism in B205’s ability was clearly misplaced as can 
be seen from the annual throughputs achieved since 2000 - only meeting the 1000 tonne level on two 
occasions as shown in Table 1. From the NDA’s projections in Table 3 this level is clearly no longer 
considered realistic.  
 
The reprocessing of Magnox spent fuel is governed by sequential Magnox Operating Programmes 
(MOP),  the  most  recent  published  by  the  NDA  in  2009  as  MOP  9. This  version  provides  three 
potential levels (bounding scenarios) of future annual throughput for dealing with the 3400 tonnes 
now awaiting reprocessing – an upper bound of 740 tonnes per year, a lower bound of 450 tonnes per 
year and a ‘very low rate’ bound of 250 tonnes per year
23. These rates result in a projected closure of 
B205 in March 2017, March 2018 and December 2028 respectively. From this it can be calculated 
that in order to reach plant closure closure in 2016/17, the NDA has utilised MOP 9’s upper bound of 
740 tonnes per year – rather than opting for the lower bound of 450 tonnes which far more accurately 
mirrors the plant’s recent performance and capability (see Appendix 6 Figure 3). 
 
One major implication of what amounts to a  ‘moveable feast’ of closure dates is that any continuation 
of Magnox reprocessing after the plant’s 2016/17 closure date further jeopardises the prospect of the 
UK meeting its commitments to the radioactive discharge targets set by OSPAR in 1998
24. These 
targets required the ‘progressive and substantial reduction’ in radioactive discharges with the aim of 
ensuring that concentrations of radioactivity in the marine environment, compared to historic levels, 
should be ‘close to zero by 2020’.   
 
The relevance of B205’s closure in respect of meeting this 2020 target was highlighted by BNFL in 
2000 when the plant’s 2012 closure was described as being an important factor in ensuring that the 
2020 target set by OSPAR would be met - affording sufficient time after 2012 for concentrations of 
radioactivity in the Marine environment to reduce to close to zero. Clearly, the current flexibility of 
B205’s closure as projected in MOP 9 - with an extension to Magnox reprocessing to 2020 or beyond 
- is likely to put paid to any hope of meeting the target. Further, contrary to BNFL’s commitment in 
2000 to meet the close to zero target, the NDA has taken a more cavalier approach to the possibility of 
missing the target, with the view that ‘then we need to move to a contingency plan – i.e. agree not to 
meet OSPAR deadline (emphasis added) or put in place a different strategy
25. 
 
Given the acknowledged correlation between reprocessing rates and level of radioactive discharge to 
sea, the NDA’s‘flat-lined’ annual targets for B205 of around 650 tonnes indicate that there can be no 
progressive and substantial reductions in sea discharge as required by OSPAR. Indeed, the failure to 
meet  throughput  targets  in  the  next  two  to  three  years  means  that  more  spent  fuel  has  to  be 
reprocessed annually over the final years in the run-up to plant closure, with an ensuing increase in 
radioactive discharges rather than the reduction required by OSPAR.  
 
Of the NDA’s target of 664 tonnes for the current financial year 2013/14,  just 223 tonnes have  
been reprocessed during the first 6 months of the financial year,  and the annual target officially 
reduced  from 664 to 600 tonnes 
26. 
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Appendix 5 
 
The Vitrification Plant (WVP) and process. 
WVP was commissioned in 1990 with two production lines (Lines 1 & 2), each projected to produce 
300 canisters of ‘vitirified product’ per year.  A third production line (Line 3) was subsequently added 
when production in the original Lines had fallen well below their annual production targets. 
 
The vitrification process converts the liquid High Level Wastes produced by Sellafield’s reprocessing 
operations.  Under  a  legally  binding  series  of  Specifications  issued  by  the  Office  for  Nuclear 
Regulation (ONR) – the latest in July 2011
27 -  the volume of these wastes must be kept within a 
specified limit and  reduced  to a ‘steady state’ level from 2015 onwards.  The crucial role played by 
the Waste  Vitrification Plant  in  making this reduction  has a further benefit to Sellafield  in  ‘that 
vitrified waste is preferable to spent and / or legacy fuel residing for longer than necessary in 
ponds’
28. 
 
The process of vitrification involves the transfer of the liquid HLW from the HLW storage tanks 
(HASTS – Highly Active Storage Tanks) to WVP where it is further evaporated at high temperature 
in a rotating calciner to form a granular powder to which glass particles are added. The mixture is then 
transferred to a melter crucible where, at high temperature, a chemical reaction binds the waste into 
the glass. This vitrified product is poured into containers (canisters) which are then moved into the 
product store.  
 
Production Lines 1 & 2 produced their first canisters of vitrified product in 1990/01. Line 3, which 
had been projected to produce 250 canisters per year, produced its first vitrified product in 2002/03. 
To date, Lines 1, 2 & 3 combined have failed to reach the production rate originally projected for 
Lines 1 & 2 – the highest rate of 482 canisters being achieved in 2005/06 and with an average rate 
since Line 3 began operating of 305 canisters. 
 
Suffering from a range of malfunctions, accidents and extended outages of Lines for repair and/or 
modification, WVP’s underperformance has been widely criticised by ONR in respect of its inability 
on occasions to make the expected inroads to the stocks of HLW in line with the requirements of 
ONR Specification. That WVP has recently managed to keep pace with the volumes of liquid HLW 
produced  by  reprocessing  reflects  poor  reprocessing  performance  rather  than  any  marked 
improvement in the process of vitrification itself.   
 
The unit of canisters used in Table 1 was routinely used as the unit of production for WVP 
until 2010 when it was changed to ‘tonnes of Uranium’ (teU) – a reference to the amount of 
uranium in the unprocessed fuel from which the HLW was derived. This was considered by Sellafield 
Ltd and ONR as being a more accurate means of quantifying the volume of waste actually vitrified.  
A broad conversion factor of between 8 to 10 tonnes of uranium being equivalent to 1 canister of 
vitirified product is used from 2009/20 onwards  in Table 1.. 
 
The NDA’s target for WVP for the current financial year 2013/14 is set at 2545 teU (346  canisters) 
appears to be routinely over optimistic and to have taken no account of  the plant’s performance 
over the last three years  in which an average of  155 canisters have been produced –  just 45% of 
this year’s target.    
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